Salt Lake  v. Hernandez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Salt Lake v. Hernandez : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Greg Hawkins; attorney for appellee.
Rebecca C. Hyde; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake v. Hernandez, No. 930663 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5580
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
faOtoto-cA 
SALT LAKE CITY, : — — 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
J < // 
MARTIN HERNANDEZ, : Case No. 94D2.73-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Simple Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 11.80.010, in the Third Judicial Circuit Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Phillip K. 
Palmer, Judge, presiding. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
GREG HAWKINS 
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY FOR SUBPOENAED PARTY 
451 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 505A 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
z|LEU 
Utah Court of AppeaM 
MAY 1 9 139% 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 940272-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Simple Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 11.80.010, in the Third Judicial Circuit Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Phillip K. 
Palmer, Judge, presiding. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 3 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
GREG HAWKINS 
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY FOR SUBPOENAED PARTY 
451 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 505A 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. MR. HERNANDEZ HAS A DUE PROCESS AND SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DISCOVERY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS REPORTS FOR IMPEACHMENT AT TRIAL . . . 8 
II. THE EXECUTIVE AND OFFICIAL CONFIDENCE 
PRIVILEGES DO NOT BAR MR. HERNANDEZ FROM 
ACCESS TO INTERNAL AFFAIRS RECORDS 10 
A. The Executive and Official Confidence 
Privileges In Police Internal Affairs 
Records Are Not Unqualified 11 
B. Mr. Hernandez's Liberty Interest and Rights 
to Discovery And a Fair Trial Outweigh Any 
Policies Supporting Secrecy of Police 
Internal Affairs Records 13 
III. MR. HERNANDEZ HAS ESTABLISHED "GOOD CAUSE" AND 
IS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS PURSUANT TO RULE 
16(a)(5) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 18 
A. Discovery Of The Internal Investigation 
Reports From Mr. Hernandez's Complaint of 
Excessive Force During His Arrest Is 
Crucial To The Preparation Of His Defense . 19 
i. 
B. The Reports From Mr. Hernandez's Formal 
Complaint Of Excessive Force To Internal 
Affairs Are Material As Impeachment Evidence 
And To His Claim Of Self Defense . . . . 21 
C. Mr. Hernandez's Request For Discovery is 
Sufficiently Specific 25 
D. Internal Affairs Records Are Within The 
Prosecutor's Control And Are Not Readily 








TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Barfield v. City of Seattle, 676 P.2d 438, 
(Wash. 1984) 12 
Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 
(1963) 8,9,16 
City of San Jose v. Superior Court. 850 P.2d 
621 (Cal. 1993) 15 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 368 (1974) 9,10,20 
Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichenstein, 
660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981) 15,22 
Giqlio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 
763, (1972) 8 
Ivester v. State, 429 So.2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983) 15 
King v. Conde. 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) . . . . 14 
Madsen v. United Television Inc.. 801 P.2d 912 
(Utah 1990) 10,11,12,13,14,16,17,24 
Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520 
(E.D. N.Y. 1982) 14 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 
989 (1987) 10 
People v. Memro, 700 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1985) 9,26 
People v. Pualisi. 376 N.E.2d 1325 (N.Y. 1978) . . . . 15 
People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1993) 15 
Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272, 102 S. Ct. (1989) . . . 20 
State v. Estrada, 738 P.2d 812 (Haw. 1987) 15 
State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) 22 
State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) 2,10,18,19,21,25,26 
iii. 
State v. Pohl. 554 P.2d 984 (N.M. 1976) 15 
State Ex. Rel. City of Portland v. Keys, 773 P.2d 
P.2d 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) 15 
State Ex. Rel. Wilson v. Thomas, 700 P.2d 1045 
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) 27 
Stinnett v. State, 789 P.2d 579 (Nev. 1990) 15 
United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 
(9th Cir. 1991) 15 
United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210 
(2nd Cir. 1989) 8,15 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 
3090 (1974) 16 
United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 
1983) 8 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution . 3,7 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . 3,9 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1993) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102.4 (1993) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1993) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(5) (1993) 3,11 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(5) . . 1,3,7,16,18,25,26 
Utah Rules of Evidence 801(d) 20 
iv. 
REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 940272-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1993), whereby the defendant in a 
Circuit Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from an interlocutory order, if upon petition for review, 
the appellate court decides the appeal would be in the interest of 
justice on any charge other than a first degree or capitol felony. 
This Court granted Mr. Hernandez's Petition for Interlocutory 
Review on November 24, 1993. A copy of the Order Granting 
Interlocutory Review is contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is a defendant charged with assaulting a police 
officer and claiming self defense entitled to discovery 
of police internal affairs investigative reports of the 
arresting officers' alleged misconduct during his arrest? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court is granted discretion to admit or deny discovery 
under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, 
this Court will not hesitate to find an abuse of discretion and 
reverse the trial court's ruling when the trial court's decision is 
based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. State v. 
Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 687 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES. RULES 
The text of the following statutes, rules, and constitutional 
provisions is contained in Addendum C. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(5) (1993) 
RULES 
Rule 16(a)(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City charged Mr. Hernandez with Simple Assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Section 11.80.010 of the Salt Lake 
City Code. The City claims that Mr. Hernandez assaulted Salt Lake 
City Police Officer Mark Nelson. See Addendum C. The State did 
not charge Mr. Hernandez with Assaulting a Police Officer, under 
§ 76-5-102.4, a class A misdemeanor. On June 18, 1993, Mr. 
Hernandez served a subpoena duces tecum to the Salt Lake City 
Police Department requesting information gathered as a result of an 
investigation of police misconduct during his arrest conducted by 
Internal Affairs. He received no response. A copy of 
Mr. Hernandez's subpoena duces tecum and the accompanying letter 
from Internal Affairs is contained in Addendum C. On July 12, 
1993, Mr. Hernandez filed a Motion to Compel Discovery asking the 
trial court for an order compelling the production of all the 
disciplinary records, internal investigation records, and 
photographs gathered as a result of Mr. Hernandez's complaint to 
Internal Affairs. A copy of Mr. Hernandez's motion is contained in 
Addendum D. In response, the City filed a Motion to Quash the 
subpoena. 
The Honorable Judge Phillip K. Palmer denied Mr. Hernandez' 
Motion to Compel, refusing him access to any information gathered 
in the course of the investigation other than photographs of the 
scene or Mr. Hernandez. The court based its ruling on the grounds 
that the internal investigation records were not material to Mr. 
4 
Hernandez's defense t r a n s c r i p t - ''JPV Ml ' I!*-' Orriei diid 
TranF - ^  \ p- s v i a; . -'- -j i: , Addendum E . 
LOUIL puisaaiiL t v •-- - " '^ 
t h e Ut-an R u . t s , -*pp- i ia : *- ; i „c- J^.-. o n e r ^ i t an appec * 
t r i '> . court ' s cic- - "-yin/ -i:r ^;sccv-'-r\ . .\ N"v*-nr-e: .-1 : 5 ~ ' , 
thi ^li-rt- a-rantp . x^ 
the lower c o u r t ' s in te r locutory order, See Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 3, 1993, Mr. Martin Hernandez was charged with 
simple assault, in violation of Section 11.80.010 of the Salt Lake 
City Code.1 The substance of the allegation against Mr. Hernandez 
is that he assaulted Salt Lake Police Officer Mark Nelson in the 
course of his arrest. Mr. Hernandez filed a complaint with the 
Internal Affairs Unit of the Salt Lake City Police Department on 
March 17, 1993, alleging police misconduct. See Addendum C, 
Attachment to petitioner's subpoena duces tecum directed to the 
Salt Lake City Police Department, Internal Affairs ("I.A."). 
Internal Affairs investigated Mr. Hernandez's allegations that 
excessive force was used to subdue him. One officer was 
disciplined for his actions during the arrest. See Addendum C, 
letter from Internal Affairs, and City's Opposition to Petitioner's 
Petition for Permission To Appeal Interlocutory Order, pg. 3, 
Statement of Facts, numbers 19 and 20 and pg. 8. Mr. Hernandez 
claims that he acted in self defense. 
1
 The following facts have essentially been stipulated to by 
the City as they appear in its Opposition to Petitioner's Petition 
for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order. See pgs. 3, 7, and 
8. 
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S I n y D y I A R Y 0 F A R G U M E N T 
Mr. Hernandez is entitled to discovery of the records from, the 
I;-.r-^v-r-.^i affa/.v.-: rvf -^  iga: ••••-• rr !;!•: 'omplai nt that the arresting 
o " ; ..:•_• , • '... -. • * stab] ished good cai lse as 
required under Utah r ;^e o:. '..r;mi!.a.i .- /ucedure 16(a) (5) The I.A. 
r•--•:-•• ' contain L±ie jbLatementd ;"<: *v--- officers who arrested Mi 
Hernandez and the officer he - . :: f assan] ting These 
statements are po:.e:• :..*:- 1 imp^ dchrnc-:!V'. evidence Therefore, they are 
mater: a ] y wind ch is diways an issue at trial. The 
investigation records are also material to Mr Hernandez's claim, of 
self defense. These records are necessary for the preparation c: 
e f f e e t :i
 u» e ei: oss -exami nat:i on of I l:i : Hernandez ' s a :: ::n :i sen: and the 
other officers who arrested him. 
Internal Affai rs records are privi 1 eged under the "official 
coni id e n c t:" ..unJ (executive pr i. vi b^e;,,:. These pi i.v.i. leges are in ?l 
unqualified. They must give way if the interests of the party 
seeking discovery outweigh the government's interest in preserving 
conf ident i a 1 i t y . Il", I i , He r na 11de z s L JL be i I, j j. 111: e i: e s I: < .;> 11!;. w e i g 11, s ! 11 *•-' 
minimal harm that disclosure would cause to the public. His rights 
t o d i s c o ve r y unde r Ru 1 e 1 6 (a) (5) a n d t he Du e P roc ess C1 a u s e o f t h e 
United States Constitution, and Ills .SixJll Ajiitiiidi;nei;r! i iijhi I 
effective cross-examination override the City's interest in 
m a i iriL, d 1 n 111" | I 11 sei recy of investigation




I. MR. HERNANDEZ HAS A DUE PROCESS AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
DISCOVERY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS REPORTS FOR IMPEACHMENT AT TRIAL 
The United States Supreme Court has held that withholding 
favorable evidence material for exculpatory or impeachment purposes 
to an accused on request violates due process. Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196 (1963); Gialio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1972). The law is 
clear that Brady and its progeny requires the disclosure of 
evidence material to impeachment. United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 
1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 
210, 216 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
"Impeachment of a witness can make the difference between 
acquittal and conviction, and this is particularly true in a trial 
. . . where credibility is the central issue in the case and the 
evidence presented at trial consists of opposing stories presented 
by the defendant and government agents." Kiszewski, 877 F.2d at 
216. This is especially true in Mr. Hernandez's case. Allegations 
have been made that Mr. Hernandez assaulted Officer Nelson. Mr. 
Hernandez claims he was not the aggressor and was justified in 
using force to defend himself. The outcome of this trial hinges on 
the jury's determination of the credibility of the officers' 
testimony. 
When Brady is invoked to obtain information not favorable on 
the issue of guilt or innocence but useful for attacking the 
credibility of an important prosecution witness, the information 
8 
withheld must hav° a definite impact on the c 
witness. Id. r"h- nf onri:r: r. contained -~ *^  nvosr.gr.;"-
repoj;I.;-. ' - ; -.- took against Mr. 
Hernandez during -.:.- m e ^ " . •.:.-•,-• - ,,<- - iiirers' statements 
about the circumstances of his arrest v • . ; : •*•.>-. Hernandez 
with the litmus r>. v whuli IIL I.'LIII I I \' 
testimony at trial. Without that litmi-- :-; • co-ni > dene-* 
i 111 y '" ;, \/c i 11 11 • i w ill be undermined. Indeed ' ; - a t ^ "f %: -* :-
interest in denying h h ^ accused acce 
th row 1 i ght rw i i ssue in "he case, .-m-• ' a rt i cu. -a? 
i nit ii '• i i i wn'ii'1 i y ui witnesses who havn not-
been rigorously cross-examined and as thorouahlv impeac . • . 
evidence permits." People v, Memro, 7'- :c •;•;• , 4 59 ;Cal. 
1:985) . 
Additionally, Mr. Hernandez's right to confrontation 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
includes t • r usts-exaii'ii oat. i« n »!.' ^  itnesses. 
Davis v. Alaska, • . .: . -.- 3. Ct . 1105 {1974 ) , 1 n Davis, 
Hiie« Cinirf ' '" udL L U C btate- r i nterest d n mad ntaining the 
cunt identic invp.nilp. of . .-. •. i: s ai i est i ecor ds v :ii o] ated t .1 I E: 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 415 U.S. at 
"'I Tin* defendant was no: allowed to cross-examine an important 
pi oseeuLiGii 'witness as to 1 ji i < ei id 1 e i ec or d and 1 id s status as a 
probationer because * a srate law requiring confidentiality of 
juucriiLf! rpcoi"" L reasoned that the cross-examination 
9 
permitted by the trial court was so inadequate as to amount to a 
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. 
Similarly, Mr. Hernandez's right to cross-examination under 
the Sixth Amendment includes an implicit right to effective cross-
examination. This right to effective cross-examination must 
necessarily extend to pretrial discovery. See Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 62, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). As the court noted in Mickelson, a party's use of 
impeachment evidence is "contingent on that party's access to such 
records." 848 P.2d at 688. Without access to this important 
impeachment material, Mr. Hernandez's right to confrontation and 
cross-examination becomes an empty formality. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 
62, (Blackmun, J., concurring). Without the necessary tools of 
effective confrontation, like the witness's prior statements, the 
exercise of cross-examination at trial is without meaning. 
II. THE EXECUTIVE AND OFFICIAL CONFIDENCE PRIVILEGES DO NOT BAR 
MR. HERNANDEZ FROM ACCESS TO INTERNAL AFFAIRS RECORDS 
The "official confidence" and executive privileges do not bar 
Mr. Hernandez from discovering the I.A. records. Internal affairs 
records are privileged under § 78-24-8 Utah Code Ann. (1993) and 
under the common law executive privilege. Madsen v. United 
Television Inc., 801 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1990). However, neither 
of these privileges is absolute. Id. The Madsen court held that 
both privileges must give way if the interests of the party seeking 
discovery outweigh the government's interest in confidentiality. 
Id. at 915. Mr. Hernandez's liberty interest, his right to a fair 
10 
trial, and his statutory and constitutional rights t : • • i 1 scovery 
outweigh both the "official confidence" and the common law 
execul. e. 
In Madsen, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "disclosure of 
internal affairs files has a very slight potentiality of harming 
the rmbl ic, espeeiaJ 1 11 1 i.^.i I yi oceed i nq win •] '" i nd i i-i al 
controls can be imposed.*11 l.d. at 917. On the other hand, Mr, 
Hernandez has substantial interests at state. He is faced with 
potential incarceration. His right to a I. i: i d I based upon nil I I In 
available facts and information hang in the balance. Indeed the 
pubili.. ji i nl: erest I n preserving the integrity ui L U C fact c : riding 
process in a criminal trial eclipses any -interest the mi . « ni.r, 
have i n cloaking the internal investigations : y.oL. i :e misconduct 
a s 1 ii on id • :: f sec recy. 
A. The Executive and official confidence Privileges In 
Police Internal Affairs Records Are Not Unqualified 
T^ie city |ias a i . . .-i statutory "officlai confidence" 
privilege in i,.A. i nve , lltdh Code Ann h ' 
(1993) provides: 
There are particul ar relations in which it is the policy 
of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it 
inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a 
witness in the following cases: 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to 
communications made to him in official confidence when 
the public interests would suffer by the disclosure, 
11 
In Madsen, the Utah Supreme Court held that this statutory 
privilege as applied to police I.A. records is by its terms only a 
conditional privilege. JEd. at 915. "Confidential communications 
to a police officer are privileged only when the public interest 
would suffer by their disclosure." Id. (quoting Barfield v. City 
of Seattle, 676 P.2d 438, 441 (Wash. 1984)). 
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized in Madsen that I.A. 
records fall under the common law executive privilege. That 
privilege likewise "is not absolute and the government's interest 
in maintaining confidentiality must be weighed against the interest 
of those seeking discovery of the material." Id. 
Madsen involved a civil defamation suit filed by a police 
officer against a television station for alleged defamatory 
statements made against him in connection with his fatal shooting 
of a fugitive. The television station subpoenaed the police 
personnel and internal investigation records of the officer. The 
city claimed the records were privileged under the "official 
confidence" privilege and the common law executive privilege. The 
district court declined to conduct an in camera review of the 
requested records and granted the City's motion for a protective 
order. Id. at 914-15. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that because the privileges 
claimed were not absolute and unqualified, the district court must 
conduct an in camera review of the police internal investigation 
files in order to balance the public's interest in maintaining 
12 
confidentiality against the interest o* party seeking discovery. 
Id. , 
±J. *-*._. Hernandez's Liberty Interest Rights to Discovery 
And a Fair Trial Outweigh Any Policies Supporting Secrecy 
Of Police Internal Affairs Records 
T j i e r ^ s ] c that public i nterests wil ] suffer harm if the I.A. 
records Mr. Hernandez seeks ai e n tad d lab] e 1 t: !::i::i a ] 
m:n;.*\c - - Hernandez's liberty is at stake; 
.dLuuuiy rights to discover y and a fair 
'.;: ir -.. . r^.-5, Furthermore, the mib.. ,. ::" s inLerest :i i 1 
p v e ^ ' • r ,:» integrity of our adversarial -:?vsretn of justice will 
xnvictic •" pfit of
 eff e ctive 
c: ess examinati .\ - \ ^tnesses. 
Whil- - -• i* : M Madsen recognized that I.A. documents are 
condi I ,i t) . MI I M' i recogn:i zed I li.il ci :i sel osiii e posed 
1 x 111 e r . y.- , • J:_d , a t t:> 17 . 1 ndeed the Madsen court 
rejected CULJL che L±*~ * " r-^iey arguments against disclosure of the 
officer's T . A . rer i. UJ , flie i i i >, Madsen claimed Lh.il 
discovery of v/estigation records would (] ) cause a 
5 eiitjct on p u n c ^ officers' wi ] ] ingness to cooperate with 
. veest" i gat ion«
 f- I? u.t ay e po] :i ce admi ni strator s from 
f .billing their duty '\.- : . ''• investigate internal complaints; and 
I " uiib ixuiii iieel y providing information to the 
T
 r, .^paiwm-jnt. Id. at 916. 
The Utah Supreme Court found all these arguments unpersuasive. 
The Madsen court, stated, rhr-il .m f f i.rnr' s incentive ; either hide 
13 
information or be forthright and honest is much more closely linked 
to the desire to protect a friend verses the fear of internal 
discipline. These motivations to tell the truth or hide misconduct 
are "more closely tied to the internal investigative machinery than 
to the fear of litigation. . . In sum, disclosure to . . . 
litigants is probably a minute influence on officers' candor." Id. 
at 916 (quoting King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 192-93 (E.D. N.Y. 
1988)) . 
Further, the Madsen court noted that knowledge that the fact 
that a limited number of persons and courts may examine the files 
may actually insure that investigations of police misconduct are 
"carried out in an even-handed fashion, that the statements are 
carefully and accurately taken, and that the true facts come to 
light, whether they reflect favorably on the individual police 
officers involved or on the department as a whole." Id. at 916-17 
(quoting Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D. N.Y. 
1982)) . 
Lastly, the court found the argument that disclosure would 
chill citizen complaints equally unpersuasive. "It is not at all 
clear that people who feel aggrieved by actions of police officers 
would even think about the possibility that their complaints might 
be disclosed to another person who feels aggrieved by police 
officers." .Id. And of course, in this case, the very citizen who 
made the complaint to Internal Affairs of police misconduct is the 
one who is requesting the discovery of the investigation records. 
This is not a case where discovery is sought of unrelated 
14 
investigations of allegations of police misconduct made by other 
people. 
The policy reasons for maintaining secrecy of I.A. records are 
as unpersuasive in a criminal case as they are in the civil 
context. A sizeable number of jurisdictions have allowed discovery 
of police I.A. records to a defendant to a criminal prosecution or 
held that the records were discoverable and ordered the court to 
perform an in camera inspection.2 
For example, in Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. 
Lichtenstein, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant to a prosecution for assaulting a police officer was 
entitled to discovery of police Internal Affairs files. 660 F.2d 
432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981). The Court reasoned that the defendant 
was entitled to discovery because in a criminal context the state 
has a compelling interest in "ascertainment of the truth." Id. at 
436. In an adversarial system of criminal justice, "the very 
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the 
system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the 
framework of the rules of evidence." Id. 
2
 The following jurisdictions have either allowed discovery of 
a police officer's I. A. files or found that the files were 
discoverable and ordered an in camera inspection by the court: 
Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 
(10th Cir. 1981); City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 621 
(Cal. 1993); People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1993); Ivester 
v. State, 429 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. 
Estrada, 738 P.2d 812 (Haw. 1987); State v. Pohl. 554 P. 2d 984 
(N.M. 1976); U.S. v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1989); Stinnett v. 
State, 789 P.2d 579 (Nev. 1990) ; People v. Pualisi, 376 N.E.2d 1325 
(N.Y. 1978); State Ex. Rel. City of Portland v. Keys, 773 P. 2d 1347 
(Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
15 
The 10th Circuit Court also recognized that another compelling 
state interest in discovery of police internal files is the 
defendant's right to exculpatory material. Id. 
Brady v. Maryland teaches us that discovery of 
exculpatory material is a compelling state interest and 
is, indeed, an integral part of the right to a fair 
trial . . . [and] when the only prosecution witnesses are 
the police officers involved, anything that goes to their 
credibility may be exculpatory. 
Id. at 436. 
Mr. Hernandez's interests in discovery are far weightier than 
the civil litigant in Madsen. As argued above, Mr. Hernandez has 
a constitutional right to discovery and a fair trial. The Due 
Process Clause insures him access to exculpatory information and 
impeachment evidence. The Sixth Amendment protects his right to 
confront and effectively cross-exam his accusers. Rule 16(a)(5) 
gives him the right to access to evidence necessary for the proper 
preparation of his defense. Lastly, the Madsen court found in 
favor of a litigant whose interests were predominately monetary. 
In contrast, Mr. Hernandez's liberty is at stake. 
Not only do Mr. Hernandez's interests outweigh the minimal 
policy reasons against discovery, the public's interests will 
suffer if police I.A. files are kept shrouded under a cloak of 
secrecy. Governmental privileges are generally not favored and 
should be narrowly construed. For example, in United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974) the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that "whatever their origins, these exceptions to the 
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor 
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expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for 
truth." 
The public's interest in full disclosure of I.A. documents is 
twofold. First, the public has an interest in assuring that 
criminal trials are just and accurate. Full disclosure of relevant 
impeachment evidence insures that the outcome of criminal trials is 
based upon testimony that has been thoroughly and rigorously tested 
through cross-examination. 
Second, the public has an interest in preventing police 
misconduct. "Once the public loses . . . confidence in their law 
enforcement officers, the legitimacy of the officers' authority 
begins to crumble . . . Perhaps the most dominant factors 
contributing to the erosion of public confidence in law enforcement 
are corruption and brutality by the officers."3 Exposure of past 
wrongdoing might inhibit future abuses of police power. 
In sum, Madsen requires that Mr. Hernandez's rights and 
interests in discovery of the I.A. investigation reports from his 
arrest be balanced against any public interests which would suffer 
by disclosure. Since "disclosure of internal affairs files has a 
very slight potentiality of harming the public," the scales tip 
overwhelming towards protecting Mr. Hernandez's substantial 
interests in a fair trial. 801 P.2d at 917. As a result, the 
executive and "official confidence" privileges must give way to his 
right to discovery. 
3
 Richard L. Pinckard, Comment People V. Memro: Is Discovery 
of Police Personnel Records an Abusive Use of Citizen Complaints? 
8 Crim. Just. J., 457 (1986). 
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III. MR. HERNANDEZ HAS ESTABLISHED "GOOD CAUSE" AND IS ENTITLED TO 
DISCOVERY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS PURSUANT 
TO RULE 16(A)(5) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Mr. Hernandez has met the "good cause" requirement of Rule 
16(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the prosecution to 
disclose any "item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for 
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense." Establishing 
good cause requires a showing that: (1) disclosure of the 
requested evidence is necessary to the proper preparation of the 
defense; and (2) the requested evidence is material to an issue to 
be raised at trial. State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 690 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
Mr. Hernandez has met the Mickelson test in this case. First, 
he has demonstrated that access to the I.A. investigation reports 
of excessive force are necessary for the proper preparation of his 
defense. The I.A. reports contain potential impeachment evidence. 
It is reasonable to assume that the records from this investigation 
contain statements from the arresting officers about the 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Hernandez's arrest, and that these 
statements may be necessary to impeach the credibility of the 
arresting officers at trial. 
Mr. Hernandez has also met the second prong of the Mickelson 
test. The City has charged him with simple assault. The alleged 
victim is one of the arresting officers. Mr. Hernandez's defense 
rests on his claim that he acted in self defense. He filed a 
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complaint with Internal Affairs alleging that the officers used 
excessive force to arrest him. See Addendum C. An internal 
investigation followed and the allegations were sustained against 
one of the officers. Id. The I.A. records also contain potential 
impeachment evidence. Credibility is always a material issue at 
trial. 
Mr. Hernandez's request was made with sufficient specificity 
and the requested documents are not readily obtainable through his 
own efforts. These records are not only necessary for the 
preparation of Mr. Hernandez's defense and material to the issues 
of credibility and self defense, but defense counsel's 
representation of her client would fall below acceptable standards 
had she not subpoenaed these documents. 
A. Discovery Of The Internal Investigation Reports From 
Mr. Hernandez's Complaint Of Excessive Force During His 
Arrest Is Crucial To The Preparation Of His Defense. 
The I.A. investigation reports from Mr. Hernandez's arrest are 
necessary to properly prepare for trial. These documents contain 
the statements of two prosecution witnesses and the complaining 
officer. Specifically, Mr. Hernandez needs these documents to 
prepare an effective cross-examination of the three officers who 
arrested him. 
It is reasonable to assume that the I.A. investigation reports 
contain the arresting officers' statements about the events which 
took place before and during Mr. Hernandez's arrest. Discovery of 
these statements are crucial to the preparation of his defense. 
Mr. Hernandez's trial will at heart be a resolution of the issue of 
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credibility. The jury will decide whether Mr. Hernandez is 
credible when he claims he acted in self defense. The jury will 
decide whether the police officers' testimony that Mr. Hernandez 
was the aggressor should be believed instead. 
"Cross examination is the principle means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his or her testimony 
are tested." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). It is the 
"age-old tool for ferreting out truth in the trial process. . . For 
two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of 
evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-
examination as a vital feature of the law." Perry v. Leake, 109 S. 
Ct. 594, 601 n. 7, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). 
The officers' prior statements made in the context of an 
internal affairs investigation are necessary for adequate 
preparation of effective cross examination. With these statements 
Mr. Hernandez can test the officers' memory and opportunity to 
perceive, explore any possible bias against him, and if needed, 
impeach subsequent inconsistent statements at trial.4 To deprive 
Mr. Hernandez of these prior statements is to deprive him of the 
opportunity to conduct a meaningful cross-examination of his 
accusers. To send him to trial without these prior statements is 
to send him to trial blindfolded. 
4
 Prior inconsistent statements are admissible under Rule 
801(d), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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B. The Reports From Mr. Hernandez's Formal Complaint Of 
Excessive Force To Internal Affairs Are Material As 
Impeachment Evidence And To His Claim Of Self Defense. 
The reports from the I.A. investigation of Mr. Hernandez's 
complaint that excessive force was used during his arrest are 
material to the issue of whether he acted in self defense. 
Additionally, the I.A. records are material because they likely 
contain potentially admissible impeachment evidence. This 
impeachment evidence consists of the officers' statements about the 
force used during Mr. Hernandez's arrest to the I.A. investigating 
officer. 
The court in Mickelson held that the defendant established 
good cause when he requested the conviction records of prosecution 
witnesses. The court reasoned that the defendant was not required 
under Rule 16 to show that a witness had engaged in prior criminal 
conduct to establish good cause. It was enough that the defendant 
requested the records because some prior convictions, if they 
existed, could be used to impeach the witness's credibility at 
trial. Ld. at 689-90. The defendant met the materiality 
requirement because he "clearly [set] forth the legitimate 
potential value of the requested evidence to the defense, [thus 
establishing] the materiality of the evidence to the issues to be 
raised at trial." Xd. at 690 (emphasis added). 
A parallel can be drawn between requests for the RAP sheets of 
prosecution witnesses and Mr. Hernandez's request for I.A. records. 
Indeed, as the 10th circuit noted, both RAP sheets and I.A. files 
"involve investigative materials concerning a person, whether that 
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person be an ordinary citizen or a police officer." Lichtenstein, 
660 F.2d at 437. Both are needed for adequate preparation for 
trial as potential impeachment evidence. Just as some prosecution 
witnesses may have admissible prior convictions, the officers' 
statements in the I. A. files regarding the circumstances of 
Mr. Hernandez's arrest may come in at trial as prior inconsistent 
statements to impeach their credibility. 
The I.A. investigative records are material to the issue of 
self defense. The City has charged Mr. Hernandez with simple 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, under the Salt Lake City Municipal 
Code. The State did not charge him with Assaulting a police 
Officer, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 
(1993). Self defense is an affirmative defense to the charge of 
simple assault. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1993). State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1992) does not bar him from raising 
the claim of self defense. The Court in Gardiner took the view 
that a defendant must have the legal right to defend against 
excessive force used by a police officer in effectuating a search 
or arrest. Id. at 573 n. 4. The I.A. reports contain information 
pertaining to the use of excessive force by the officers as that 
was the substance of Mr. Hernandez's complaint. See Addendum C. 
Only one officer was found to have violated department 
regulations. See Addendum C. This fact does not affect the 
materiality of the I.A. affairs records of the other two arresting 
officers as potential impeachment evidence. Even if the 
complaining officer, Mark Nelson, was not the officer who was 
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reprimanded the I. A. records are never the less material as 
potential impeachment evidence. Aside from Mr. Nelson, the other 
two officers participated in or are eyewitnesses to the events that 
took place during Mr. Hernandez's arrest. 
The fact that Internal Affairs only found "cause" against one 
of the arresting officers does not diminish the materiality of the 
I.A. records of the other two officers to Mr. Hernandez's claim of 
self defense. Their actions are part of the surrounding 
circumstances of the alleged assault, and may have contributed to 
Mr. Hernandez's reasonable belief that he must use force to defend 
himself. Also, the purpose, process, and standard of proof of an 
I.A. investigation differs drastically from a criminal case. 
Lastly, as a matter of public policy, the courts should not 
require a defendant show that Internal Affairs found "cause" 
against an officer in order to establish that the evidence is 
material to his defense. " [E]xperience provides ample reason to 
believe that [Internal Affairs] units have been ineffective in 
dealing with complaints of police misconduct. . . [I]nformation 
from empirical studies indicates that most police officers have 
been the recipients of at least one complaint and some officers 
studied have received over a dozen. If valid complaints are simply 
whitewashed . . . the admission of rejected complaints might be 
necessary to insure fairness to the defendant." 5 
If the courts allow discovery of only the I.A. records of 
officers when "cause" is found, they will create a serious 
5
 Pinckard, supra, note at 457. 
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conflict of interest for I.A. officers. If an officer is found to 
have used excessive force, that evidence may result in an acquittal 
for the defendant. Such a finding runs counter to the department's 
goal of obtaining convictions. The temptation then arises to find 
"no cause" if Internal Affairs knows that such a finding will 
thwart the defendant's access to the I.A. investigation records. 
Access to both "cause" and "no cause" records relieves I.A. 
investigators of that potential conflict. 
Lastly, Mr. Hernandez has made at minimum a sufficient showing 
of materiality to warrant an in camera review of the I. A. 
investigative records. No review of the requested documents was 
made. While Mr. Hernandez maintains that he has already met his 
burden of showing materiality, in the alternative, he asserts that 
under Madsen, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 
Motion to Compel Discovery without the benefit of an in camera 
review. It is unclear how the trial court could determine whether 
the information contained in the I.A. investigative reports was 
material to Mr. Hernandez's defense without having seen them. 
In Madsen, the Utah Supreme Court held that when the trial 
court is faced with a discovery request for I.A. records it must 
balance the competing interests of the parties through an in camera 
examination of the materials sought. Id. at 915. The trial court 
placed Mr. Hernandez in an impossible position. The judge did not 
make an in camera review as required under Madsen, yet 
Mr. Hernandez's request for discovery was denied because he could 
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not establish to the trial court's satisfaction how this 
inaccessible information was material to his defense. 
C. Mr. Hernandez's Request for Discovery is Sufficiently 
Specific. 
In Mickelson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's request for 
discovery of the arrest records of prosecution witnesses. The 
court noted that even though "good cause" under Rule 16(a) (5) was 
liberally defined, the defendant has a duty to "identify the 
requested evidence with some specificity." 848 P.2d at 690. The 
defendant in Mickelson requested conviction records of prosecution 
witnesses for use as impeachment evidence at trial. The court held 
that the defendant's request was sufficiently specific because it 
was limited to a "select type of evidence, concerning a well-
identified and relatively small group of individuals." Id. 
Similarly, Mr. Hernandez's request for the I.A. records from 
the investigation of his complaint of excessive force is limited to 
a small pool of evidence. His request is limited to one 
investigation only. It concerns the actions of only three officers 
from one specific incident. He identified in his subpoena duces 
tecum the specific investigation records he was requesting through 
reference to Internal Affairs' own letter to Mr. Hernandez. See 
Addendum C. 
Mr. Hernandez is not asking for the entire personnel records 
of all the arresting officers. He is not asking for all I.A. 
records resulting from all unrelated past complaints of police 
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misconduct against the arresting officers, though he may even be 
entitled to those. He is merely asking for the records from one 
investigation only; the investigation which resulted from his 
formal complaint to Internal Affairs; the investigation which 
resulted in a finding that one of the arresting officers acted 
outside of acceptable police practice. This is clearly not a 
"fishing expedition." 
Mr. Hernandez should not be required to offer additional 
"foundational facts" to support his claim that these records are 
material to his defense. It is enough that the I.A. reports deal 
directly with Mr. Hernandez's formal complaint that excessive force 
was used against him and that he intends to claim self defense at 
trial. "To require specificity in this regard would place an 
accused in the Catch-22 position of having to allege with 
particularity the very information he is seeking." Memro, 700 P.2d 
at 464; See also, Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 688 n. 13. 
D. Internal Affairs Records Are Within The Prosecutor's 
Control And Are Not Readily Obtainable By Mr. Hernandez. 
The I.A. records are within the city prosecutor's control. In 
Mickelson, the court noted that criminal defense attorneys were not 
permitted access to State Bureau of Criminal Identification files 
and can only obtain them through Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(a)(5). 848 P.2d at 689. The issue was not whether the 
prosecutor possessed the requested records, but whether he had 
access to and control over them. 
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Similarly, the city prosecutor has access to I.A. files. 
Internal Affairs is a division of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department which possesses and controls its records. The police 
are properly considered an arm of prosecution for discovery 
purposes. See State Ex. Rel. Wilson v. Thomas, 700 P.2d 1045, 
1046-47 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (records of city police bureau's 
internal investigations division of arresting officer's statements 
relating to defendant's arrest are within the control of the 
prosecutor and are therefore discoverable). 
The possibility that defense counsel may have an opportunity 
to interview the arresting officers before trial is no substitute 
for access to their statements to Internal Affairs. Mr. Hernandez 
is interested in seeking interviews before trial. He is equally, 
if not more interested in the results of the interviews conducted 
by Internal Affairs. The fact that Mr. Hernandez may have access 
to one type of evidence does not preclude him from seeking access 
to other, perhaps more reliable evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hernandez respectfully moves this Court to reverse the 
lower court's denial of his Motion to Compel Discovery with orders 
that the requested documents be made available to him. In the 
alternative, Mr. Hernandez respectfully moves this Court to reverse 
the lower court's finding that the I.A. documents are immaterial to 
his defense and order an in camera review providing the lower court 
with guidelines in making its determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /# day of May, 1994. 
^/, .#/.£. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Salt Lake City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Martin Hernandez, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 930663-CA 
J* Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
This matter is before the court on a petition for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All 
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time 
required, for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 
5(e). 
Dated this .0^ day of November, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pamela T . Greenwooa, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
471 JUDICIAL UUDU 78-Z4-S 
78-23-14. Property held by joint tenants or ten-
ants in common. 
If an individual and another own property in this 
state as joint tenants or tenants in common, a credi-
tor of the individual, subject to the individual's right 
to claim an exemption under this chapter, may obtain 
a levy on and sale of the interest of the individual in 
the property. A creditor who has obtained a levy, or a 
purchaser who has purchased the individual's inter-
est at the sale, may have the property partitioned or 
the individual's interest severed. 1981 
78-23-15. Exempt ion provis ions appl icable in 
bankruptcy proceedings . 
No individual may exempt from the property of the 
estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the property 
specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as 





78-24-1. Who may be witnesses —• Jury to judge 
credibility. 
78-24-2. Competency to be witness. 
78-24-3. Judge or juror may be witness — Proce-
dure. 
78-24-4. Interpreters — Subpoena — Contempt. 
78-24-5. Subpoena defined. 
78-24-6. Duty of witness served with subpoena. 
78-24-7. Liability to forfeiture and damages. 
78-24-8. Privileged communications. 
78-24-9. Duty to answer questions — Privilege. 
78-24-10. Proceedings in aid of or supplemental to 
attachment, garnishment, or execu-
tion. 
78-24-11. Rights of witnesses. 
78-24-12. Witnesses — Exempt from arrest in civil 
action. 
78-24-13. Unlawful arrest — Void — Damages re-
coverable. 
78-24-14. Liability of officer making arrest. 
78-24-15. Discharge of witness unlawfully ar-
rested. 
78-24-16. Oaths — Who may administer. 
78-24-17. Form. 
78-24-18. Affirmation or declaration instead of 
oath allowed. 
78-24-19. Variance in form of swearing to suit wit-
ness' belief. 
78-24-1. Who m a y b e witnesses — J u r y t o j u d g e 
credibility. 
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as 
specified in this chapter, who, having organs of sense, 
can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known their 
perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither par-
ties nor other persons who have an interest in the 
event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor 
those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons 
on account of their opinions on matters of religious 
belief; although, in every case the credibility of the 
witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in 
which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, 
or by evidence affecting his character for truth, hon-
esty or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradic-
tory evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of 
his credibility. 1953 
78-24-2. Competency to be witness . 
Every person is competent to be a witness except as 
otherwise provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
1964 
78-24-3. Judge or juror may be witness — Pro-
cedure. 
The judge himself or any juror may be called as a 
witness by either party; but in such case it is in the 
discretion of the court to order the trial to be post-
poned or suspended, and to take place before another 
judge or jury. 1953 
78-24-4. Interpreters — Subpoena — C o n t e m p t 
When a witness does not understand and speak the 
English language, an interpreter must be sworn in to 
interpret for him. Any person may be subpoenaed by 
any court or judge to appear before such court or 
judge to act as interpreter in any action or proceed-
ing. Any person so subpoenaed who fails to attend at 
the time and place named is guilty of a contempt. 
1953 
78-24-5. S u b p o e n a defined. 
The process by which the attendance of a witness is 
required is a subpoena. It is a writ or order directed to 
a person and requiring his attendance at a particular 
time and place to testify as a witness. It may also 
require him to bring with him any books, documents 
or other things under his control which he is bound 
by law to produce in evidence. 1953 
78-24-6. Duty of w i tnes s served with subpoena . 
A witness served with a subpoena must attend at 
the time appointed with any papers under his control 
required by the subpoena, and answer all pertinent 
and legal questions; and, unless sooner discharged, 
must remain until the testimony is closed. 1953 
78-24-7. Liabil ity to forfeiture and damages . 
A witness disobeying a subpoena shall, in addition 
to any penalty imposed for contempt, be liable to the 
party aggrieved in the sum of $100, and all damages 
which he may sustain by the failure of the witness to 
attend, which forfeiture and damages may be recov-
ered in a civil action. 1953 
78-24-8. Priv i leged communicat ions . 
There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to pre-
serve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be ex-
amined as a witness in the following cases: 
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may ei-
ther during the marriage or afterwards be, 
without the consent of the other, examined 
as to any communication made by one to the 
other during the marriage. 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by 
one spouse against the other; 
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding 
for a crime committed by one spouse 
against the other, 
(iii) to the crime of deserting or ne-
glecting to support a spouse or child; 
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceed-
ing for abuse or neglect committed 
against the child of either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided 
by law. 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him or his advice given 
regarding the communication in the course of his 
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professional employment. An attorney's secre-
tary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be examined, 
without the consent of his employer, concerning 
any fact, the knowledge of which has been ac-
quired in his capacity as an employee. 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the 
consent of the person making the confession, be 
examined as to any confession made to him in his 
professional character in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the 
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil ac-
tion as to any information acquired in attending 
the patient which was necessary to enable him to 
prescribe or act for the patient. However, this 
privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the 
patient in an action in which the patient places 
his medical condition at issue as an element or 
factor of his claim or defense. Under those cir-
cumstances, a physician or surgeon who has pre-
scribed for or treated that patient for the medical 
condition at issue may provide information, in-
terviews, reports, records, statements, memo-
randa, or other data relating to the patient's 
medical condition and treatment which are 
placed at issue. 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to 
communications made to him in official confi-
dence when the public interests would suffer by 
the disclosure. 
(6) A sexual assault counselor as defined in 
Section 78-3c-3 cannot, without the consent of 
the victim, be examined in a civil or criminal 
proceeding as to any confidential communication 
as defined in Section 78-3c-3 made by the victim. 
1990 
78-24-9. Duty to answer questions — Privilege. 
A witness must answer questions legal and perti-
nent to the matter in issue, although his answer may 
establish a claim against himself; but he need not 
give an answer which will have a tendency to subject 
him to punishment for a felony; nor need he give an 
answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade 
his character, unless it is to the very fact in issue or 
to a fact from which the fact in issue would be pre-
sumed. But a witness must answer as to the fact of 
his previous conviction of felony. 1953 
78-24-10. Proceedings in aid of or supplemental 
to attachment, garnishment, or execu-
tion. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding 
section [Section 78-24-9], a party or a witness exam-
ined in proceedings in aid of or supplemental to at-
tachment, garnishment, or execution is not excused 
from answering a question on the ground that his 
answer will tend to convict him of the commission of 
a fraud, or to prove that he has been a party or privy 
to, or has acknowledge [knowledge] of, a conveyance, 
assignment, transfer or other disposition of property 
concerned for any purpose; or on the ground that he 
or any other person claims to be entitled, as against 
thejudgment creditor or a receiver appointed or to be 
appointed in the proceedings, to hold property derived 
from or through the judgment debtor or to be dis-
charged from the payment of a debt which was due to 
the judgment debtor or to a person in his behalf. But 
an answer cannot be used as evidence against the 
person so answering in a criminal action or proceed-
ing, except in an action for perjury against him for 
falsely testifying. 1953 
78-24-11. Rights of witnesses. 
It is the right of a witness to be protected from 
irrelevant, improper or insulting questions, and from 
harsh or insulting demeanor, to be detained only so 
long as the interests of justice require it, and to be 
examined only as to matters legal and pertinent to 
the issue. 1953 
78-24-12. Witnesses — E x e m p t from arrest in 
civil action. 
Every person who has been in good faith served 
with a subpoena to attend as a witness before a court, 
judge, commissioner, referee or other person, in a 
case where the disobedience of the witness may be 
punished as a contempt, is exempt from arrest in a 
civil action while going to the place of attendance, 
necessarily remaining there and returning there-
from. 1953 
78-24-13. Unlawful arrest — Void — D a m a g e s 
recoverable . 
The arrest of a witness contrary to the preceding 
section [Section 78-24-12] is void, and when willfully 
made is a contempt of the court, and the person mak-
ing it is responsible to the witness arrested for double 
the amount of the damages which may be assessed 
against him, and is also liable to an action at the suit 
of the party serving the witness with the subpoena for 
the damages sustained by him in consequence of the 
arrest. i953 
78-24-14. Liability of officer making a r r e s t 
An officer is not liable for making the arrest in 
ignorance of the facts creating the exemption, but is 
liable for any subsequent detention of the witness, if 
such witness claims the exemption and makes an affi-
davit stating: 
(1) That he has been served with a subpoena to 
attend as a witness before a court, officer or other 
person, specifying the same, the place of atten-
dance and the action or proceeding in which the 
subpoena was issued; 
(2) That he has not thus been served by his 
own procurement, with the intention of avoiding 
an arrest; and, 
(3) That he is at the time going to the place of 
attendance, or returning therefrom, or remaining 
there in obedience to the subpoena. 
The affidavit may be taken by the officer, and exon-
erates him from liability for discharging the witness 
when arrested. 1953 
78-24-15. Discharge o f w i t n e s s unlawful ly ar-
rested. 
The court or officer issuing the subpoena, and the 
court or officer before whom the attendance is re-
quired, may discharge the witness from an arrest 
made in violation of Section 78-24-12. If the court has 
adjourned before the arrest or before application for 
the discharge, a judge of the court may grant the 
discharge. 1953 
78-24-16. Oaths — Who m a y administer. 
Every court, every judge, clerk and deputy clerk of 
any court, every justice, every notary public, and 
every officer or person authorized to take testimony 
in any action or proceeding, or to decide upon evi-
dence, has power to administer oaths or affirmations. 
1953 
78-24-17. Form. 
An oath or affirmation in an action or proceeding 
may be administered, the person who swears or af-
Rule 16 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 656 
ing the child's testimony, so that the jury may 
view both the child and the defendant, if that 
may be arranged without violation of other re-
quirements of Subsection (2) 
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse 
or of a sexual ofifense against a child, the court may 
order, upon motion of the prosecution and for good 
cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or 
victim younger than 14 years of age be taken outside 
the courtroom and be recorded That testimony is ad-
missible as evidence, for viewing in any court pro-
ceeding regarding the charges if the provisions of 
Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the follow*, 
mg provisions 
(a) the recording is both visual and aural and 
recorded on film or videotape or by other elec-
tronic means, 
(b) the recording equipment is capable of mak-
ing an accurate recording, the operator is compe-
tent, and the recording is accurate and is not al-
tered; 
(c) each voice on the recording is identified; 
and 
(d) each party is given an opportunity to view 
the recording before it is shown in the courtroom. 
(4) If the court orders that the testimony of a child 
be taken under Subsection (2) or (3), the child may 
not be required to testify m court at any proceeding 
where the recorded testimony is used. 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the follow-
ing material or information of which he has knowl-
edge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of 
the defendant or codefendants, 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defen-
dant or codefendant, 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment, and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defen-
dant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as 
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead The prose-
cutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, 
the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such infor-
mation as required by statute relating to alibi or in-
sanity and any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor 
to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attor-
ney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before 
trial or as soon as practicable He has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the 
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notify-
ing the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reason-
able times and places 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any 
time order that discovery or inspection be denied, re-
stricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may 
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or 
in part, in the form of a written statement to be in-
spected by the judge alone If the court enters an or-
der granting relief following such an ex parte show-
ing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be 
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be 
made available to the appellate court in the event of 
an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceed-
ings it is brought to the attention of the court that a 
party has failed to comply ^ith this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or in-
spection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-
cumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the ac-
cused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup, 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of 
other bodily impressions, 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenact-
ment of the crime, 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of 
disguise, 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, 
fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials 
which can be obtained without unreasonable in-
trusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical 
inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approxi-
mate appearance at the time of the alleged of-
fense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused 
is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable no-
tice of the time and place of such appearance shall be 
given to the accused and his counsel Failure of the 
accused to appear or to comply with the requirements 
of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, 
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revo-
cation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence 
in the prosecutor's case m chief for consideration 
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the 
accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions 
as the court should deem appropriate 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in-
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to 
trial m his absence, 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present, and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defen-
dant from trial for good cause shown which may 
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may 
require the personal attendance of the defendant at 
the trial 
ADDENDUM C 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
saitEffie W £ & i M t ° C o u r t , State of Utah 
T e l e p h o n e : Sgfcp#&£ COUNTY. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 











THE STATE OF UTAH TO 
(Name of Witness) (Address of Witness) Pate Served) 
g&T.T T.&KT? TTTY POT.TrP ngPfrPTMETKTr TVTWVrM. A T m T P Q 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled action before 
court at the &&K8fi±JB&SPci P^ce: x x x x x x x x x 
DATE 
. 19 Time. 
Place: Third Circuit Court 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, documents, or 
other items: 
P l e a s e p r o v i d e a copy o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d on t h e a b o v e named 
d e f e n d a n t i n r e g a r d t o t h o i n v e o t i g a t i o n o o n d u c t c d by I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s , 
P l e a s e s e e a t t a c h e d l e t t e r . 
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a warrant for your arrest. 





// Paul L. Vance 





R U B E N B . ORTEGA OEEOCE C O R R A O I N I 
e n t e r o r P O U C C MAVOM 
June 2, 1993 
Mr. Martin Hernandez 
828 Washington Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I.A. Case 93/015 
Dear Mr. Hernandez, 
On March 17, 1993 you filed a complaint vith our Internal Affairs 
Unit alleging an officer assaulted you and used excessive force 
during your arrest, incident to a situation at 108 South 500 West 
on January 23, 1993. 
This letter is to inform you that the investigation into this 
matter has been completed. The investigation has been reviewed 
and the allegations have been "Not Sustained" by the officer's 
division commander in the case of all but one of the officers. 
"Not Sustained" means: Facts do not support a conclusion as to 
whether or not the officers violated policy or procedures. 
In the case of one of the officers, it has been determined that 
his actions were in violation of the policy and/or procedures of 
the department and that allegation has been "Sustained" by the 
officer's division commander. 
Dispositions of Internal Affairs investigations are a matter of 
administrative review only and are not to be construed as 
admission of civil liability. Disciplinary action taken as a 
result of sustained complaints is the sole prerogative of the 
Chief of Police and is not public information. Appropriate action 
is being taken in this matter. 
We thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. If you 
have any questions concerning this investigation and disposition, 
please contact Captain. W.C Duncan during working hours. 
Sincerely, 
Ruben B. Ortega 
Chief of Police 
Captain W.C. Duncan 
Pioneer Division 
Salt Lake Police Department 
cc;file 
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ADDEKDUM D 
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REBECCA C. HYDE (6409) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
430 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
M 0 J993 
1 = / 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 





MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Case No. 931001396MC 
A Subpoena Duces Tecum in the above-referred matter was 
served to the Salt Lake City Police Department on the 18th day of 
June, 1993 (see Attachment A) . Defendant moves this Court for an 
order compelling compliance in this case of the matters requested 
in Attachment A, including but not limited to, any and all 
disciplinary records, internal investigation records, or complaints 
filed and all photographs. 
DATED this % day of July, 1993. 
JUI S//L 
REBECCA C. HYDE ^) 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of 
the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this day of July, 1993. 
REBECCA C. HYDE (6409) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, : MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, : COMPEL DISCOVERY 
-v- : 
MARTIN HERNANDEZ, : Case No. 931001396MC 
JUDGE PALMER 
Defendant. 
MARTIN HERNANDEZ through his attorney REBECCA C. HYDE 
submits the following memorandum of law in support of his motion to 
compel discovery of specified police files necessary to his defense. 
POINT I 
THE RECORDS REQUESTED ARE BOTH RELEVANT AND 
ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL TO THE ISSUES OF THE 
USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE BY THE POLICE OFFICER 
Utah Rules of Evidence 401 defines relevant 
information/evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." 
Defendant has been charged with assaulting a police officer, 
destruction of property and battery. Evidence of acts of 
aggressiveness or violence on the part of the officers is relevant on 
- 1 -
the issue of who was the aggressor.1 
Recently, in Los Angeles, California, defendant Rodney King 
was charged with assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. 
The information contained in police reports describing the incident 
was inaccurate. Recent examination of the Los Angeles officers 
employment records revealed prior allegations of excessive force on 
the part of some of the officers involved. 
B. DDE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE STATE MUST 
DISCLOSE EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that withholding 
evidence favorable to the accused on issues of guilt or punishment 
violates due process. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
The underlying principle in the Court's holding in this landmark case 
is simple, yet imperative to the proper functioning of our criminal 
justice system. The Court stated: 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration 
of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly... A 
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused 
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or 
reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on 
the defendant. See^ld. at 87. 
Eleven years later in United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683 
(1974), the Supreme Court reinforced the importance of disclosure of 
all facts in our criminal justice system. The Court recognized that 
it is of paramount importance to the functioning of the Courts and to 
ensure justice is done, that "compulsory process be available for 
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the 
defense." See Id. at 709. 
- 2 -
In this case, the defendant seeks personnel files which 
contain evidence of acts of aggressiveness by the officer present at 
the time defendant was arrested. This evidence is critical to 
effective confrontation and cross examination of the very individual 
that has accused defendant of this charge. This information is 
pertinent to defendant's case and refusing to disclose this 
information violates defendant's rights to a fair trial, due process 
of law, effective confrontation and cross examination of his 
accusers, and effective assistance of counsel. These rights are 
guaranteed the defendant under both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
The State has a constitutional duty to disclose the evidence 
requested by the defendant. The State cannot choose to prosecute the 
defendant for crimes, and then deny him access to evidence that is 
relevant to guilt or innocence, even when otherwise such evidence is 
or might be privileged against disclosure. ^ State v. Fleischman, 495 
P.2d at 282. 
POINT III 
THE "OFFICIAL CONFIDENCE" PRIVILEGE MUST GIVE WAY TO 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL 
The "official confidence" privilege set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-8 (Supp. 1991)2 and the confidential information 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4 (2) (Supp. 1991). does not preclude 
disclosure of the requested materials. 
In Madsen v. United Television. 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(1990), the Utah Supreme Court ordered an in camera examination of a 
- 3 -
police officer's personnel and internal affairs file in a defamation 
action involving a police officer and a Salt Lake City television 
station. Madsen. 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. The Supreme Court 
rejected Salt Lake City's claim that the officer's internal affairs 
2Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(5) provides that n [a] public 
officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in 
official confidence when the public interests would suffer by the 
disclosure." 
3Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4 provides that "A public officer or 
public employee may not (1) accept employment or engage in any 
business or professional activity which he might reasonably expect 
would require or induce him to improperly disclose controlled 
information which he has gained by reason of his official position.M 
- 4 
and personnel files were privileged under the "official confidence" 
provision (Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8), Id. at 13-14. In rejecting 
Salt Lake City's claim, the Utah Court adopted Colorado guidelines in 
examining executive privilege questions: 
The trial court must balance the competing interests through 
an in camera examination of the materials for which the 
official information privilege is claimed. Such a review 
enables the trial court: (a) to allow or disallow discovery 
as to individual items of material for which the privilege 
is claimed: or (b) to excise or edit from individual items 
those matters which it determines to come within the scope 
of the privilege; or (c) to take other protective measures 
pursuant to [Utah Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c) ... The 
factors to be considered by the trial court in this in 
camera balancing process proceeds on an ad hoc basis, the 
effect of the doctrine of stare decisis in cases requiring 
application of the official information privilege is 
limited. 
Id. at 14 (cruotina Martinelli v. District Court of Colorado. 612 P.2d 
1083, 1088-89 (Colo. 1980)) 
This court must keep in mind that this privilege is at most 
a qualified privilege. In fact, the United States Supreme Court 
disfavors evidentiary privileges stating that "evidentiary privileges 
in litigation are not favored and even those rooted in the 
Constitution must give way in proper circumstances." Herbert v. 
Lando. 441 U.S. 153 (1979)• The Court further stated that "whatever 
their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they 
are in derogation of the search for truth. "United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. at 710. 
These cases show that very rarely will the courts uphold an 
evidentiary privilege where the evidence sought is critical to the 
- 5 -
search for truth. This is of particular importance in a criminal 
trial as the defendant is almost always facing the possibility of 
incarceration, and the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person 
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. 
The Madsen Court also rejected the argument that disclosure 
would be detrimental to police investigations because confidential 
information is involved or that internal affairs investigations would 
be harmed. Madsen, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court stated that disclosure of personnel and internal affairs 
records with appropriate safeguards, f,may serve to insure that 
[police] investigations are carried out in an even-handed fashion, 
that the statements are carefully and accurately taken, and that true 
facts come to light...." Id. at 15 (quoting Marcv v. County of 
Suffolk. 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) .4 
4Madsen also rejected Salt Lake City's private papers 
privilege, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 to-89, and its attorney client 
and work product claim. Madsen, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 
(investigations reported in an officer's internal affairs file are 
not undertaken in anticipation of litigation; work product doctrine 
does not apply to information collected or communications made in 
normal course of business). 
- 6 -
POINT IV 
POLICE OFFICERS DO NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY IN MATTERS RELATED TO ACTS DONE BY THEM 
IN THEIR PUBLIC CAPACITY. 
The case of Denver Policemens' Protective Ass'n v. 
Lichtenstein. 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981) is similar to this case. 
The defendant in that case, was charged with assault on a police 
officer and the defendant filed a motion to compel discovery of 
personnel and staff inspection bureau files of each officer present 
at the arrest. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower courts order 
compelling discovery, denying the officer's claim that the order 
violated his right to privacy. 
The Court in Lichtenstein identified the right to privacy as 
wa right to prevent disclosure of personal matters.11 See id at 435. 
The Court went on to cite the United State Supreme Court in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services. 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) wherein 
the Court stated: 
We may agree with appellant that, at least when government 
intervention is at stake, public official, including the 
President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected 
privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any 
acts done bv them in their public capacity. (Emphasis 
added). 
The documents the defendant seeks to discover relate to acts 
done by the officer in his public capacity as a police officer. The 
officer does not have a right to privacy claim when defendants seek 
evidence of acts of aggressiveness or excessive force by an officer 
while on duty as a police officer. 
Furthermore, even some personal data does not fall into the 
- 7 -
zone of confidentiality and in such a situation, the Court must 
determine whether it does. Lichtenstein. 660F.2d at 435 and 
Martinelli v. District Court in and for the City and County of 
Denver, 612 P.2d 1083 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 1980). 
POINT V 
DISCLOSURE OF THE REQUESTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
A GOVERNMENTAL - EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. 
The Lichtenstein case is also helpful on this issue. In 
that case, the officers raised the claim that disclosure of the 
documents would violate their executive privilege. 
The Court applied a balancing test between the government's 
interest in maintaining confidence and the interests of the defendant 
seeking discovery. The Court draws an important distinction between 
that case and the Nixon case. The Court points out that the 
considerations in a case such as Lichtenstein (and the present case) 
supporting disclosure of the requested evidence is even stronger than 
in the Nixon case because the rights of the defendants are at stake 
rather than the prosecution's interest. See Id. at 437. 
The Court followed in the footsteps of the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Nixon, and rejected the argument that governmental 
processes will be frustrated by allowing disclosure of police 
department files. See Id. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT 
IF THE CITY REFUSES TO DISCLOSE REQUESTED INFORMATION 
The Court should apply the "Andolschek doctrine" and dismiss 
these proceedings in the interest of justice if the State refuses to 
- 8 -
disclose requested evidence. United States v. Andolschek. 142 F.2d 
503 (2nd Cir. 1944). 
If the State persists in claiming a privilege after the 
Court has ruled otherwise, the State has only two choices: disclose 
the evidence, or dismiss the charges. State ex rel Kerns v. Read, 
501 P.2d 82 (1972) . Furthermore, the Court may sua sponte dismiss 
the charges as the State's continued refusal to disclose evidence as 
ordered cam be viewed as an expression of the State's decision to 
dismiss the charges. See Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental precepts of the Constitution and the proper 
functioning of the court system require that the evidence requested 
by the defendant be disclosed. Defendant admits there are a number 
of interests, to be considered in this analysis. However, no matter 
which way these interests are balanced, the outcome must be that the 
defendant's rights to the process of law must be protected above 
other concerns. 
The defendant has made a showing of materiality and 
favorableness of the requested material. The Court should reject any 
argument of the City's that secrecy should be maintained, for 
- 9 -
this position is "in derogation of the search for truth." This is 
especially so when the City is the party charging the defendant with 
these crimes. The City cannot accuse the defendant of a crime and 
then hide the evidence that may exculpate him. 
DATED this £~ day of July, 1993. 
REBECCA C. HYDE ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of 
the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this day of July, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM E 
REBECCA C. HYDE (6409) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E a s t 500 South, S u i t e 300 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CO 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT / tifT" 





ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO/COMPEL DISCOVERY 
No. 931001396 
?E PALMER 
On June 18, 1993 Defendant/; MARTIN HERNANDEZ, served a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum in the above-referred matter to the Salt Lake 
City Police Department requestirig all disciplinary records and 
internal investigations records stemming from Defendant's complaint 
of police misconduct on January 23, 1993. On July 8, 1993, 
Defendant filed a Motion To Compel Discovery. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion To 
Compel be denied. It is further ordered that the City shall 
subpoena all of the police officers involved in the incident from 
January 23, 1993. The Defendant shall have access to any 
photographs of himself or the scene taken pursuant to the police 
department's internal investigation. Further, the Defendant shall 
use both his complaint to the police department, and the letter he 
received from Internal Affairs dated June 2, 1993, stating the 
outcome of the investigation to impeach at trial. 
Approved as t o Form 
DATED t h i s / day of October, 1993 
HONORABLE JODGEf PALMER 
Third Circuit Court 
DELIVERED to the foregoing to the o f f i c e of the Sal t Lake 
City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
t h i s ~7 day of October, 1993. 
/ j 
REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT : ~J ' 1994 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 






Case No. 931001396MC 
JUDGE PHILLIP K. PALMER 
Appearances for the Defense: REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Appearances for the Prosecution: TODD GODFREY 
Attorney for Respondent 
City Prosecutor's Office 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Salt Lake City v. Martin Hernandez 
CASE NO. 931001396 
ATD: REBECCA C. HYDE 
ATP: TODD GODFREY 
JUDGE PHILLIP K. PALMER 
TAPE NO. , SIDE B 
TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE'S RULING 
JUDGE: Hernandez. Defense motion to compel discovery. Are you 
prepared on that, Mr. Godfrey? 
ATP: I understood that that was going to be ruled on, is that 
correct? 
JUDGE: Yes. I didn't receive any response from the City but I 
think I'm prepared to rule based on past rulings that I've made and 
the law as I understand it to be. 
ATP: If I may inquire the Court, you did receive Mr. ??? in 
support of his motion to quash the subpoena? 
JUDGE: I did not but I inquired of it but I think I can mile 
anyway. 
ATP: Ok. 
JUDGE: Let me ask you this, Ms. Hyde, what photographs is it you 
are referring to in your motion? 
ATD: Photographs of the defendant ??? the scene ??? 
JUDGE: Do you know of any that were taken? 
ATD: No, Your Honor, because I haven't seen any discovery. I have 
no idea what's in his files. 
JUDGE: Ok. You'd be entitled to any photographs. What complaint 
do you refer to? 
ATD: The complaint that I'm referring to is the complaint 
Mr. Hernandez, the case number is included on the letter that he 
received from the internal affairs investigation. 
JUDGE: Doesn't he have a copy of his own complaint? 
ATD: The complaint, what I'm asking for is the investigation that 
any records that came from the investigation pursuant to the 
complaint. 
JUDGE: But you're also asking for complaints and I'm just 
wondering if that is the complaint that he made which I assume he 
would have access to. 
???: He would have access to that, yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Ms. Hyde, with regard to the disciplinary records and 
internal investigation records, the Court finds that you are not 
entitled to those. They are not material to Mr. Hernandez' ???. 
They are strictly internal matters of the police department. You 
are entitled to any photographs that were taken of the incident, if 
any were. I doubt if they were but, Mr. Godfrey, I'd ask your 
office to determine that and see if there's any photographs that 
were taken. 
ATP: Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: And he'd be entitled to those. Ms. Hyde, the fact that the 
defendant's complaint against one officer was sustained by internal 
affairs, I believe, is admissible to impeach that officer if 
necessary. 
ATD: Your Honor, I don't even know which officer it was. I mean, 
I have absolutely no access to this information. 
JUDGE: The prosecution is ordered to have all officers involved in 
the incident and in the internal affairs matter present at the 
trial so the defendant can determine through cross examination 
2 
which officer the defendant's complaint was sustained against. And 
then with regard to the letter you received and your client 
received from internal affairs, you may use that at the trial in 
??? to impeach that officer is necessary, Ms. Hyde. 
ATD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Ok. 
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